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ABSTRACT
For over a century, anti-trust law has been used to maintain an open and fair market economy by preventing monopolies. 1 However, anti-trust law has never precisely defined the
term “monopoly”, which makes evaluating the interactions between the prohibition of monopoly and encouraging competition
increasingly challenging. 2
In 2006, the Hong Kong Government appointed Arculli &
Associates Solicitor Firm to study issues relating to competition in the auto-fuel retail market in Hong Kong. 3 A test based
on contribution margins was recommended, leading to the con-

1 MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 54
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2004).
2 Id. at 59.
3 THE HONG KONG LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, HONG KONG SAR
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL LEGISLATIVE PAPER LC Paper No. CB(1)1303/0506(03) (2006) (H.K.).
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clusion that price fixing is not a crime in the industry. 4
This article examines the problems related to Arculli & Associates Solicitor Firm’s conclusion. First, price fixing is a per
se violation (in or by itself) of the anti-trust law in the United
States. Second, it is difficult for the courts to evaluate price fixing because the evidence of such activities between corporations is not easily available. Third, the test has applied nonstandardized accounting principles, which clash with the accounting industry on numerous grounds.
To combat these problems, this paper proposes a revised
and objective “Contribution Margin” test to measure monopolies. Based on general accounting principles, this paper
presents a comparative study of contribution margins between
listed companies in the United States and Hong Kong.
I.

BACKGROUND

The Hong Kong government has long taken on a noninterventionist policy towards the Hong Kong economy, contributing to the limited legal restrictions on the marketplace. 5
This laxity, however, began to change with the handover of sovereignty in July 1997. 6 The last decade has seen a series of
debates, involving both the government and the public, on the
competitive economic environment of Hong Kong. 7 In response,
the government has appointed Arculli & Associates Solicitor
Firm as a consultant on issues related to the auto-fuel retail
market in Hong Kong. 8 The firm presented the results of their

MOTTA, supra note 1, at 73.
Milton Friedman, Hong Kong Wrong, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2006, at A2,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116009800068684505.html?mod=opinion_main_commentaries.
6 Id.
7 See THE HONG KONG LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, HONG KONG
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL PANEL ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MEETING,
UPDATED BACKGROUND BRIEF ON THE INTRODUCTION OF A CROSSSECTOR COMPETITION LAW IN HONG KONG, LC Paper No. CB(1)372/0809(04), 1-12 (2008) (H.K.).
8 HONG KONG SAR GOVERNMENT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND
LABOUR BUREAU GOVERNMENT OF THE HKSAR, STUDY OF THE AUTOFUEL RETAIL MARKET 3 (2006) (H.K.).
4
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study in the Arculli & Associates Report (Arculli Report), 9
which was provided by the Economic Development and Labour
Bureau for use as a reference document at the Meeting of
Competition Policy in Hong Kong, hosted by the Panel of Economic Service of the Hong Kong Legislative Council. 10 In 2008,
having received positive feedback from the public, the Hong
Kong government introduced a bill in competition law to the
Hong Kong Legislation Council (HK Legco) at the Panel on
Economic Development Meeting. 11
According to the United States approach, which maintains
that price fixing is a per se violation of anti-trust law, the leading oil companies in Hong Kong would have indeed violated the
law with their price fixing activities, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons Co.,. However, the difference between
these two jurisdictions stems from the legislation that set the
criteria to evaluate monopolistic powers objectively. Nevertheless, both the United States and Hong Kong tests have their
inherent problems when enforcing anti-trust law. Thus, the Arculli Report introduces a “Contribution Margin” test, based on
accepted general accounting principles, with the aim of reducing legislative discretion in these cases. 12
This article consists of three parts. The first discusses the
background of the Hong Kong Competition Legislation together
with a consultation paper supported by the Hong Kong Government. The second part examines the information gathered
from the literature review. Based on the contribution margin
analysis - a method widely used in managerial accounting - the
last section recommends a model that identifies the competi9 THE HONG KONG LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, HONG KONG LEGISLATIVE
COUNCIL PAPER LC PAPER No. CB(1)1303/05-06(03), (2006) (H.K.).
10
THE HONG KONG LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, HONG KONG
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL AGENT FOR THE MEETING ON FEB. 24, 2009 (H.K.).
11 THE HONG KONG LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
PANEL ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MEETING, UPDATED BACKGROUND
BRIEF ON THE INTRODUCTION OF A CROSS-SECTOR COMPETITION LAW IN
HONG KONG, LC Paper No. CB(1)372/08-09(04), 1-12 (2008) (H.K.).
12 HONG KONG SAR GOVERNMENT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND
LABOUR BUREAU GOVERNMENT OF THE HKSAR, STUDY OF THE AUTOFUEL RETAIL MARKET 4 (2006).
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tion stage of a company or an industry in the market.
II. WEAKNESSES OF THE MEASUREMENT IN THE ARCULLI &
ASSOCIATES’ REPORT AND OTHER INDICATORS
A.

Gross Margin Analysis in The Arculli & Associates’ Report

The Arculli Report, titled the “Study of the Auto-Fuel Retail Market,” was prepared by the Economic Development and
Labour Bureau (EDL Bureau). 13 It focuses on how the government determines the scope of monopolistic activities under
competition law legislation. It is regarded as a foundational
source in discussions of competition law legislation.
The first conclusion of the Arculli Report states that there
is “no clear evidence of collusion by oil companies in the Hong
Kong auto-fuel retail market,” 14 a conclusion highly dependent
on Section 1 of the US Sherman Act. The report performs a
profit analysis (see Table 4.1), which shows that the contribution margin of the oil companies is relatively high on an international scale. The report explains this result by taking note of
high land costs and concludes that the relatively high gross
margins in Hong Kong still fall within a reasonable range. 15
However, it should be noted that in marginal accounting practice, other operating costs are not usually taken into account. 16
There are two obvious loopholes in the report. First, a sufficiently high profit and gross margin, though not the sole indicators, are suitable criteria to measure whether a company is a
monopoly. 17 Pun-Lee Lam and Sylvia Chan in their book Competition in Hong Kong’s Gas Industry, 18 use the example of the
gas industry to outline the framework of the competition environment in Hong Kong. Unlike the petroleum industry, the
Id. at 3.
Id. at 22.
15 HONG KONG SAR GOVERNMENT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND
LABOUR BUREAU GOVERNMENT OF THE HKSAR, STUDY OF THE AUTOFUEL RETAIL MARKET 45 (2006).
16 See infra Part 4.1.
17 PUN-LEE LAM & SYLVIA CHAN, COMPETITION IN HONG KONG’S GAS
INDUSTRY 19 (Chinese Univ. Press 2000).
18 Id.
13
14
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Hong Kong and China Gas Company Limited (HKCG) is the
only gas supplier in Hong Kong, 19 although it faces indirect
competition from electricity companies in the domestic energy
market. 20 Lam and Chan compare the stock price of HKSC
with the Hang Seng Index—the leading Hong Kong stock market indicator - between 1982 and 1997. 21 The authors demonstrate that the contribution margin of the company rose consistently between 1973 and 1996 due to government intervention,
which contributes to the consolidation of monopolistic power. 22
However, comparisons of stock prices may not be the most effective strategy to prove the existence of predatory market behavior because stock prices can be affected by a series of nonoperating factors. On the other hand, an increase in contribution margin to improve operation profit has always been a
strong indicator of a monopoly in the market. 23
As for the second loophole, it should be noted that high
selling prices are not caused by high land costs, but by investors who are willing to pay high prices because of investment
opportunities. 24 The Arculli Report claims that the high selling
price of petrol in Hong Kong is caused by the high land cost, 25
but this claim contradicts economist David Ricardo’s argument
in his book: On the Principle of Political Economy and Taxation. 26 Ricardo writes that, in the example of land and corn
production, high corn prices are not the result of high land
prices, but that land prices are a result of the predicted profits
that sellers want to gain from the production of corn. 27 The
purchasers of factors of production, such as land, are willing to
Id. at xvii-xxv.
Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 MOTTA, supra note 1, at 27.
24 See generally David Ricardo, On the Principles of Political Economy
and Taxation, LIBRARY OF ECON. & LIBERTY, http://www.econlib.org/library/Ricardo/ricP1a.html#Ch.2,%20On%20Rent (last visited Mar. 31, 2011).
25 HONG KONG SAR GOVERNMENT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND
LABOUR BUREAU GOVERNMENT OF THE HKSAR, STUDY OF THE AUTOFUEL RETAIL MARKET 9, 12-13 (2006).
26 Ricardo, supra note 24, at ch. 2.
27 Id.
19
20
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spend more because the expected profit is high. 28 In other
words, rent would not have been high if no one had made use of
these production factors for profit. In light of Ricardo’s explanation, the argument of the Arculli Report is simply not feasible.
Besides these two loopholes, the biggest problems in the
report are the misuse of accounting concepts to interpret law
and the faulty application of cases to legal issues. As a precise
definition of “monopoly” in competition law legislation and a
spectrum of anti-competitive behaviors are essential to this legal reform, the legal and accounting point of views shall be reexamined in the following two sections.
B. Weaknesses of Other Indictors
Share price is the most common indicator reflecting a company’s profitability. 29 In their analysis of the town gas industry
in Hong Kong, Pun-Lee Lam and Sylvia Chan compare the
high return of the Hong Kong and China Gas Limited to the
Hang Seng Index, the major stock market of Hong Kong. 30 The
authors use share price as an indicator because it is regarded
as one of the major elements of equity return. 31 In the long run,
the share price reflects the profitability of a company, except in
the case when share options are awarded to senior management. In past decades, some scholars suggested that when the
interests of owners (the principals who own the companies) and
managers (the agents who run the business) are different,
share options might bind the interests of the two. 32
Theoretically, including share options as a portion of remuneration binds managers’ interests to the owners’; the managers would, in this case, have a vested interest in maximizing
company profit and, thereby, the share price they own. However, this assumption does not work in practice because the managers may exercise their options and cash their shares after
Id.
LAM & CHAN, supra note 17, at 22.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 20.
32 See generally Michael C. Jensen &William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, J. FIN.
ECON. 305 (1976).
28
29
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they have resigned. The grantees therefore tend to enter into a
contract that provides them with short-term profits, but that
affects the company negatively in the long run. 33
The impact of the sub-prime mortgage crisis on the Hong
Kong and Shanghai Bank Corporation (HSBC) speaks for itself;
by the end of the fiscal year 2008, HSBC had suffered from a
high bad-debt provision, which was the main reason for the
nearly 70% drop in net profits. 34 Although the current senior
management gave up their bonuses due to unsatisfactory performance, John Bond, the former chairperson who was responsible for taking the company into this high-risk market, was
not affected by the bonus reduction because he retired in
2006. 35 Although some companies prohibit managers from exercising such a practice for a period after their resignations,
such as the third-year period introduced by the China Life Insurance Co. Ltd. in 2006, 36 a company’s share price may still
not be a reliable indicator of its profitability.
Furthermore, share price is not a reliable criterion in legal
tests because it is easily affected by external factors. A good
example of this issue is the result of a claim made by the Chinese media on August 2, 2007. 37 The media claimed that the
Chinese government would soon confirm the “Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII)” scheme, which allowed individuals in China to invest in the Hong Kong stock market. 38
33 Jennifer N. Carpenter, Does Option Compensation Increase Managerial
Risk Appetite? (NYU Working Paper No. FIN-98-016), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1296411.
34 Summary Consolidated Income Statement, HSBC HOLDINGS PLC
ANNUAL REV. 2008, http://www.2008.annualreview.hsbc.com/financial_statements/consolidated_income_statement.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2011).
35 Historical Highest Provision of HSBC after Sub-prime Storm, CHINA
REV.
NEWS,
http://www.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1005/8/2/8/100582895.html?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=100582895 (last visited Apr. 12, 2011).
36 China Life Insurance Co., Ltd. Designs Its Share Option Reward
Scheme, THE MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF CHINA (Nov. 17, 2009),
http://jingyuan.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/zhongyaozt/200611/20061103767944.h
tml (last visited Nov. 12, 2010).
37 The First QDII Authorized Agent is Appointed, H.K. ECON. J., Aug. 2,
2007, at P11.
38 Id.
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Following this announcement, the Hang Seng Index raised
from 22,443.25 on August 2, 2007 to 31,492.88 on November 1,
2007, 39 the historical peak at closing. However, two days later,
Wen Jiabao, the Premier of the People's Republic of China, announced that the scheme was not to be put in place. 40 A year
after Wen’s announcement, the Index plummeted to 14,344.37
on November 3, 2008. 41 The proposed scheme has been left
hanging until the present day, and the share market in Hong
Kong has experienced fluctuations. Although the shares returned to equilibrium after Wen’s announcement, fluctuation
indicates how unreliable share prices can be as an indicator for
a legal test.
All the same, net profits alone are not a good indicator because they too can be affected by a range of tangential factors,
like, as Chicago scholars suggest, high performance. 42 For example, the profits made from food and beverages sold in gas
stations affect the total income of the petroleum company.
However, this income is not relevant to petrol sales and the
contribution margin analysis only concentrates on the profitability of the quantity of petrol sold. Compared with the Lerner
Index, 43 contribution margins focus more on the corporatation
itself, when the former may be affected by the special nature of
a product sold or the demand elasticity of customers. 44
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE ARCULLI & ASSOCIATES’ REPORT
IN US SHERMAN ACT
In addition to its use of non-standardized accounting concepts, the Arculli Report does not fully present and discuss relevant cases of price fixing before it jumps to the conclusion
39

2010).

YAHOO! FIN. H.K., http://hk.finance.yahoo.com (last visited Oct. 1,

Wen Jiabao: The QDII Scheme shall not Affects Stability of the Stock
Market, H.K. INFO. SERV. DEP’T, (Nov. 3, 2008), http://sc.info.gov.hk/gb/www.news.gov.hk/tc/category/businessandfinance/071103/html/071103tc03
003.htm.
41 YAHOO! FIN. H.K., http://hk.finance.yahoo.com (last visited Oct. 1,
2010).
42 MOTTA, supra note 1, at 78.
43 Id. at 110.
44 Id. at 111.
40
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that price fixing in the petroleum industry is not a crime.
Above all, it merely refers to a series of cases held by the Unite
States Court of Appeal to cite opinions about individual issues
of price fixing. It makes no mention of the leading case, Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., in which the
United States Supreme Court ruled that price fixing is a per se
violation of the Sherman Act. 45 Furthermore, the United States
Supreme Court price fixing case, State Oil Co. v. Khan, must be
addressed for an in-depth and well-rounded discussion of the
topic. A discussion of price fixing that is based on cases from
the lower courts of the United States and neglects the judgments of two major Supreme Court cases is simply insufficient.
United States legislation contains a series of statutes concerning anti-trust law, such as the Sherman Act, the Clayton
Act, the Robinson-Patman Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act. 46 As an international law, the Sherman Act was first
referred to in the Arculli Report to determine whether the petroleum industry in Hong Kong fits into the scope of international competition law. 47
A.

Relevant Sections of US Sherman Act

The Competition Policy Review Committee, under the
Competition Policy Advise Group, refers to the Sherman Antitrust Act, a prominent statute in the United States, as one of
the foreign authorities for its overseas practice section. 48 Sections 1 and 2 are the major sections in the Sherman Act because they outline the scope of international competition law. 49
Section 2 is entitled Trusts, etc., in Restraint of Illegal Trade;
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2011).
Donald S. Clark, The Robinson-Patman Act: General Principles, Commission Proceedings, and Selected Issues, F.T.C., http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/patman.shtm (last visited Apr. 12, 2011).
47 HONG KONG SAR GOVERNMENT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND
LABOUR BUREAU GOVERNMENT OF THE HKSAR, STUDY OF THE AUTOFUEL RETAIL MARKET 62 (2006).
48 ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS:
PEARSON INTERNATIONAL EDITION 384 (7th ed. 2009).
49 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2011).
45
46
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Penalty. It states that:
[E]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every
person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by
fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other
person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years,
or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. 50

According to the decision United States v Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass’n, if a group of entities intentionally form a cartel
to fix prices, then they have violated the Sherman Antitrust
Act. 51 However, this scenario is unlikely because companies
would recognize that any written agreement between them to
fix prices would openly break the law. Thus, the authorities
must use circumstantial evidence to determine whether there
are any monopolistic activities in practice, such as oligopolistic
industries being dominated by a few firms. The act itself does
not explicitly define what types of agreements constitute a sufficient concert to form a “contract, combination or conspiracy.” 52 The analysis of Arculli’s Report attempts to classifying
the issue of whether such an agreement exists, however, is unlikely completed for missing the leading cases above.
B. Price Fixing Issue in the Arculli & Associates’ Report
The Arculli Report refers to three cases to determine
whether the petroleum industry in Hong Kong falls under the
scope of the Sherman Act. 53 By referring to two cases in the
United States Court of Appeal, the Report concludes that United States anti-trust law does not prohibit price fixing activi15 U.S.C. § 1.
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
52 PHILLIP AREEDA, LOUIS KAPLOW & AARON S. EDLIN, ANTITRUST
ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 202 (6th ed. 2004).
53 HONG KONG SAR GOVERNMENT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND
LABOUR BUREAU GOVERNMENT OF THE HKSAR, STUDY OF THE AUTOFUEL RETAIL MARKET 62-63 (2006) [hereinafter HONG KONG SAR
GOVERNMENT, STUDY OF THE AUTO-FUEL RETAIL MARKET].
50
51
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ties. 54 However, it is clear that lower courts (i.e., the Court of
Appeals) hold less authority than the United States Supreme
Court, the highest judiciary body of the country, 55 which classifies price fixing as a per se violation of the Sherman Act, see
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co..
C. The Scope of Price Fixing Under Article 1 of the Sherman
Act in the US Supreme Court
In a country that operates under a common law legal system, the decisions of the Supreme Court override the decisions
of the lower courts. 56 It is therefore illogical to bypass the decisions of the Supreme Court and focus on the opinions of a lower
court, especially when the latter’s view is contrary to the prevailing opinion of the Supreme Court.
Between 1911 and 1997, the United States Supreme Court
maintained the decision made in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v John
D. Park & Sons, which maintains that price fixing is a per se
violation of the Sherman Act. 57 In this decision, Justice Holmes
affirms that any contracts made to maintain prices would violate the Sherman Antitrust Act, and comments on the issue of
social benefits under any such agreement:
[T]he Dr. Miles Medical Company knows better than we do what
will enable it to do the best business. We must assume its retail
price to be reasonable, for it is so alleged and the case is here on
demurrer; so I see nothing to warrant my assuming that the public will not be served best by the company being allowed to carry
out its plan. I cannot believe that in the long run the public will
profit by this court permitting knaves to cut reasonable prices for
some ulterior purpose of their own, and thus to impair, if not to
destroy, the production and sale of articles which it is assumed to
be desirable that the public should be able to get. 58

The circumstances of the Dr. Miles case clearly differ from
Id.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, §1
56 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (2011).
57 See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373
(1911).
58 Id.
54
55
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those of the Hong Kong petroleum industry. In the former,
there was a written agreement presented by the plaintiff as a
single entity of wholesalers and retailers; in the latter, there is
no such document among the petroleum companies in Hong
Kong. In spite of this difference, the case is still notable because it was the first decision made by the United States Supreme Court to enforce Section 1 of the Sherman Act regarding
price maintenance. 59 Therefore, it has relevance for the situation in Hong Kong.
The United States Supreme Court’s stance on price fixing
is further affirmed in the case: United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co. 60 When applying the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court
states that:
[U]nder the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose
and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se. Where the machinery for price-fixing is an
agreement on the prices to be charged or paid for the commodity
in the interstate or foreign channels of trade, the power to fix
prices exists if the combination has control of a substantial part
of the commerce in that commodity. 61

Further, Albrecht v. Herald Co., reaffirms the decision that
price fixing is a per se violation of the Sherman Act. 62 It states:
“The question in this case is not whether dictation of maximum
prices is ever illegal, but whether it is always illegal. Petitioner
is seeking, and now receives, a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict of a jury that he had failed to show that the practice
was unreasonable in this case.” 63 However, the Supreme Court
overruled Albrecht in State Oil Co. v. Khan, which divided the
offense of price fixing into two categories: vertical and horizontal maximum price fixing. 64 Because of this case, vertical price
fixing is no longer considered a per se violation of the Sherman
59 Jeffrey Bradford, The Antitrust News: “Resale price maintenance after
Leegin,” ELLIS & WINTERS, http://www.elliswinters.com/?p=inside/5news/stories&story=antitrust_news_bradford_08 (last visited Apr. 12, 2011).
60 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150 (1940).
61 Id. at 223.
62 Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
63 Id. at 880.
64 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
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Act, as Justice O’Connor states:
[I]n overruling Albrecht, we of course do not hold that all vertical
maximum price fixing is per se lawful. Instead, vertical maximum price fixing, like the majority of commercial arrangements
subject to the antitrust laws, should be evaluated under the rule
of reason. In our view, rule-of-reason analysis will effectively
identify those a situation in which vertical maximum price fixing
amounts to anticompetitive conduct. 65

Although the concept of vertical price fixing in the State
Oil case is no longer a per se violation of anti-trust law in the
Unite States, the State Oil case provides a reasonable test to
justify this legal rationale. Furthermore, after the State Oil
case, horizontal price fixing is still considered a breach of the
Sherman Act. 66 The cases referred to in the Arculli Report are
therefore unreliable because the opinions of the lower courts
should not be relied upon when their views conflict with those
of the Supreme Court. In the case of the Hong Kong petroleum
industry, the per se violation will still be applicable if horizontal price fixing is found in the retailing market.
1. New Development in the U.S. v LG Display Co., Ltd. and
LG Display America, Inc. (2008), CR 08-0803 VRW.
In 2008, the defendants of United States v LG Display Co.,
United States v. Chunghwa Picture Tubes, , and United States
v. Sharp Corporation, agreed to pay a total sum of USD 585
million to settle their prosecutions for price fixing. 67 The fine
paid by LG Display, USD 400 million, 68 was the second largest
amount awarded under the Sherman Act in history. 69 For their
part, Sharp Corporation paid USD 120 million, 70 representing
Id. at 22.
Id.
67 LG, Sharp, Chunghwa Agree to Plead Guilty, Pay Total of $585 Million
in Fines for Participating in LCD Price-fixing Conspiracies, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/November/08-at-1002.html (last
visit Apr. 12, 2011).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
65
66
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the twelfth largest amount awarded under the Sherman Act. 71
Chunghwa Picture Tubes, Ltd. paid USD 65 million, 72 which is
the second largest antitrust criminal fine in the history. 73
In terms of law, however, LG Display may not be a leading
case. First, the defendants were willing to pay the United
States government before the court made the decision to end
the litigation. Second, it was merely a case heard in the Unites
States District Court for the Northern District of California. As
mentioned earlier on, in the common law jurisdiction of the
United States, a case heard in a district court may not have an
effect on the whole country. Nevertheless, this case is referable
not only for the huge amount paid by the defendants, but also
for the nature of the case itself. Unlike the opinions made in
the lower courts cases cited in the Arculli Report, the reasoning
of the LG Display case matches the principles of the decision
made by the United States Supreme Court, especially for the
horizontal price model. Among other things, the case provides
further information on what type of agreement violates the
Sherman Act.
The grounds that the United States Department of Justice
prosecuted LG Display and Chunghwa for violation of the
Sherman Act were described:
[F]rom on or about September 21, 2001 to on or about June 1,
2006, the defendants and their coconspirators entered into and
engaged in a combination and conspiracy in the United States
and elsewhere to suppress and eliminate competition by fixing
the prices of thin-film transistor liquid crystal display panels
("TFT-LCD"). The combination and conspiracy engaged in by the
defendants and their coconspirators was in unreasonable restraint of interstate and foreign trade and commerce in violation
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1).The charged combination and conspiracy consisted of a continuing agreement, understanding, and concert of action among the defendants and
their coconspirators, the substantial terms of which were to agree
to fix the prices of TFT-LCD. 74
Id.
Id.
73 Id.
74 See Indictment: United States of America v. Cheng Yuan Lin, a.k.a.
71
72
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In examining these allegations, it is too vague for The Arculli Report to merely emphasizes a “plus factor” when determining whether corporate agreements violate Section 1 of the
Sherman Act. 75 In 2007, when the United States Supreme
Court, decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v Twombly, it upheld the decision in the Court of Appeals that: “[p]lus factors are not required to be pleaded to permit an antitrust claim based on parallel conduct to survive dismissal.” 76 Moreover, this study for
the settlement of LG Display case can be directly comparable to
the HK Petroleum industry because in both cases, the they
have been accused in court for price fixing activities with unreasonably high prices.
D. Horizontal Price Fixing in Hong Kong Oil Industry?
Based on these findings, the next question that arises revolves around how the court determines whether price fixing
exists. In its discussion of the United States Anti-Trust Act and
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the Arculli Report emphasizes
the existence of agreements by referring to lower court decisions. 77 However, as Phillip Areeda, Louis Kaplow, and Aaron
S. Edlin remark, it is difficult to track written evidence of such
agreements that would directly violate the Sherman Act. 78 It
almost goes without saying that “firms contemplating a conspiracy will conceal their tracks or attempt to achieve their
goals more indirectly.” 79 The Arculli Report simply concludes
that “United States antitrust law does not prohibit oligopolists
from pricing above competitive levels in the absence of an
agreement to do so.” 80 In contrast, Phillip Areeda, Louis KapC.Y. Lin, Wen Jun Cheng, a.k.a. Tony Cheng, and Duk Mo Koo, No. CR 090110 MMC (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f243500/243521.pdf.
75 HONG KONG SAR GOVERNMENT, STUDY OF THE AUTO-FUEL
RETAIL MARKET, supra note 53, at 62.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 PHILLIP AREEDA, LOUIS KAPLOW & AARON S. EDLIN, ANTITRUST
ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 113-14 (6th ed. 2004).
79 Id. at 202.
80 HONG KONG SAR GOVERNMENT, STUDY OF THE AUTO-FUEL
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low, and Aaron S. Edlin contend that “oligopolists sometimes
can achieve cartel-like results without any express agreement.” 81 They caution, “proving a conspiracy in restraint of
trade often involves usual difficulties of interring the existence
of an agreement from defendants’ behavior.” 82
IV. THE CONTRIBUTION MARGIN ANALYSIS OF THE ARCULLI &
ASSOCIATES’ REPORT
A.

Revenue

The Arculli Report performs a gross margin (or contribution margin) analysis to evaluate whether the petroleum companies in Hong Kong have earned unreasonably higher profits
in comparison with companies in other countries by means of
collusion or price fixing. 83 This is a commonly used profit analysis for regular petrol and ULSD diesel sales in Hong Kong. 84
However, the Report’s method of calculating the percentage of
contribution margin is not acceptable according to the Hong
Kong Accounting Standard, the “Bible” of accounting principles
in Hong Kong. 85
Contribution margin (or profit margin) analysis is a useful
tool for a company’s management team to evaluate financial
performance and to make investment divisions. It is defined as,
“the amount remaining from sales revenues after variable expenses have been deducted.” 86 According to the Hong Kong AcRETAIL MARKET, supra note 53, at 62.
81 PHILLIP AREEDA, LOUIS KAPLOW & AARON S. EDLIN supra note 78,
at 20.
82 Id.
83 HONG KONG SAR GOVERNMENT, STUDY OF THE AUTO-FUEL
RETAIL MARKET, supra note 53, at 16.
84 See HONG KONG CONSUMER COUNCIL’S REPORT, http://www.consumer.org.hk/website/wrap_en2/oil9811/chinese/report.htm, (last visit Apr. 4,
2011).
85 See Members' Handbook Volume II – “Financial Reporting Standards,”
H.K. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS (HKICPA), http://app1.hkicpa.org.hk/ebook/HKSA_Members_Handbook_Master/volumeII/contentpage.p
df.
86 RAY H. GARRISON & ERIC W. NOREEN, MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTING
211 (8th ed. 2000).
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counting Standard (HKAS), the Hong Kong version of the International Accounting Standard (IAS) 8788 “revenue” is defined
as: “[t]he gross inflow of economic benefits during the period
arising in the course of the ordinary activities of an entity
when those inflows result in increases in equity, other than increases relating to contributions from equity participants.” 89
Although no definition is provided in the Inland Revenue Ordinance (IRO), the Hong Kong Inland Revenue Department
provides one in its Departmental Interpretation and Practice
Notes (DIPN):
[T]he term “profits” in paragraph 1 of Article 1 is not defined in
the Arrangement. Its meaning is to be ascertained in accordance
with the laws of both Sides. In the Mainland, profits refer to all
profits derived by an enterprise directly from its business activities. In Hong Kong, profits refer to the business profits derived by
an enterprise and are computed in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and the provisions of the IRO. 90

Generally, the sales revenue is equal to the amount received from the customer to the company. However, there is an
exception when the company withholds part of the amount as a
tax for the government.
In paragraph 8, the HKAS 18 also states that:
[R]evenue includes only the gross inflows of economic benefits received and receivable by the entity on its own account. Amounts
collected on behalf of third parties such as sales taxes, goods and
services taxes and value added taxes are not economic benefits
which flow to the entity and do not result in increases in equity.
87 Hong Kong Accounting Standard 18 Revenue, H.K. INST. OF CERTIFIED
PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS (HKICPA) ¶ 7 (Mar. 2010), http://app1.hkicpa.org.hk/ebook/HKSA_Members_Handbook_Master/volumeII/hkas18.pdf.
88 The IAS is used in more than 100 countries. See Press Release, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Proposes Roadmap Toward Global Accounting
Standards to Help Investors Compare Financial Information More Easily
(Aug. 27, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008184.htm.
89 Hong Kong Accounting Standard 18 Revenue, supra note 87, at ¶ 7.
90 INLAND REVENUE DEP’T H.K., DEPARTMENTAL INTERPRETATION AND
PRACTICE NOTES NO. 32, 10 (June 1998), available at http://www.ird.gov.hk/eng/pdf/e_dipn32.pdf.
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Therefore, they are excluded from revenue. 91

Under this principle, excises and duties received from customers in the oil companies should be excluded from calculations of
revenue. HKAS 18 rejects the accounting method in the Arculli
Report, which does not treat excises and duties as economic
benefits contributing to the entities; instead, they are withheld
by the petroleum companies for the government as part of their
revenue. Excises and duties should not be treated as variable
costs when the fund is actually held by the sellers as a trustee,
rather than as an income statement item for calculating the
contribution margin and net income. For this reason, in the Arculli Report’s gross profit analysis, the revenue of petrol is
overestimated because the sales amount received is actually
not fully recorded as the revenue. If this misleading figure is
eliminated, the sales of regular petrol and ULSD Diesel would
not be HK$11.13 and HK$5.78 per liter, but HK$5.07 and
HK$4.67 respectively (see Table 4.1 and 4.2). Although this adjustment does not affect the actual amount of the contribution
margin, it could be highly misleading when conducting the contribution margin analysis by percentage.

91

Members' Handbook Volume II, supra note 85, ¶ 8.

INTERSTATE
COMPARISON
USE
OF
CONTRIBUTION MARGIN IN DETERMINATION OF
PRICE FIXING
19
Table 4.1 - Contribution margin of Petrol Sales in Hong
Kong Margin Analysis - (Year to 30 June 2005) Arculli &
Associates’ Report Version 92
Regular Petrol

ULSD Diesel

HK$/ Per litre

HK$/ Per litre

Pump Price

12.06

7.23

Typical Discount

(0.93)

(1.45)

Price after Discounts

11.13

5.78

Excise/ Duty

(6.06)

(1.11)

Product Cost

(3.00)

(2.86)

Gross Margin

2.07

1.81

Land

(1.02)

(1.02)

Construction Costs

(0.14)

(0.14)

Operating Costs

(0.36)

(0.36)

Credit Card Commission

(0.05)

(0.05)

Government Rent and Rates

(0.07)

(0.07)

Terminal Storage

(0.08)

(0.08)

Distribution

(0.06)

(0.06)

Net Margin

0.29

0.02

As & of Ex-Duty Pump Price

4.80%

0.30%

As & of Ex-Duty Discounted
Price

5.50%

0.50%

92

HONG KONG SAR GOVERNMENT, supra note 8, at 6.
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Table 4.2 - Amended Contribution Margin of Petrol Sales
in Hong Kong Margin Analysis - (Year to 30 June 2005) 93
Regular Petrol

ULSD Diesel

HK$/ Per litre

HK$/ Per litre

Pump Price (Net)

5.07

4.67

Product Cost

(3.00)

(2.86)

Contribution Margin in
Dollar Amount (a) – (b)

2.07

1.81

Contribution Margin in
Percentage (c) / (b)

40.83%

38.76%

a)

b)

c)

B. Fixed Cost and Variable Costs
The essential step of calculating contribution margin divides all costs into two categories: variable costs and fixed
costs. The difference between these two is their variations
alongside the different level of activities. Whereas variable
costs are directly caused by the products sold, other costs remain fixed. In theory, nonetheless, there are no fixed costs in
the long run because all costs are subject to the changes of
sales volume. 94
In the case of the petroleum industry, the variable costs
are directly influenced by each of the oil liters sold, while the
rest of the costs remain the same. 95 Land cost is generally regarded as a fixed cost because the rent of the petroleum station

Id.
FARRISON & NOREEN, supra note 86, at 58.
95 See id.
93
94
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is fixed now matter the quantity of oil sold. 96 Therefore, the report should not include land costs in the analysis and argue
that high petroleum price is caused by the high land costs.

96

Id. at 57.
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V. CONTRIBUTION MARGIN ANALYSIS – A TOOL FOR
MONOPOLY MEASUREMENT
To determine price fixing, general accounting principles
and formulas should be considered. Despite the errors in the
Arculli Report on the competitive circumstances of the Hong
Kong petroleum industry, the contribution margin method is a
useful tool. It identifies the profitability of the companies in
comparison to the general business environment of the territory. 97 The method uses the net sales revenue (i.e., gross revenue
minor discount) so that the gross selling prices will not be misleading when discounts are being offered. 98 Furthermore, using
net sales revenue better complies with the Accounting Standard than a method using gross revenue; the Accounting Standard defines revenue as “the gross inflow of economic benefits,”
where discounts are never received by the sellers. 99
A.

Legal Ground of Using the Contribution Margin

Although the Arculli Report insists that high land costs are
not the reason for the rise in oil prices, 100 the existence of collusion or a monopolistic position cannot be established merely by
a high contribution margin. 101 However, an unreasonably high
contribution margin in the same industry in comparison to other countries is still an important indicator when determining
the competition environment of the petroleum industry in
Hong Kong. The government does make use of contribution
margin analysis to identify the nature of different business activities.
The concept of “Totality of the Facts,” which aims to take
into consideration all relevant factors when drawing a conclusion, is widely used in Business Law. 102 Gross profit is obviousMembers' Handbook Volume II, supra note 85, ¶ 7.
Yeung Wei Hon, A Few Words for the Oil Companies, WISERS, Jan. 6,
2005, http://www.wisers.com/corpsite/global/b5/products/wisenews.html.
99 Members' Handbook Volume II, supra note 85, ¶ 7.
100 HONG KONG SAR GOVERNMENT, supra note 8, at 9.
101 Id.
102 See Comm’r of Inland Revenue v Magna Indus. Co. Ltd., [1995].
97
98
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ly one of the most important factors in determining the existence of unreasonably high profits. When the Inland Revenue
Department performs field audits to detect tax evasion, profit
margin in percentage is one of the essential elements that are
studied because:
cases for field audit can be said that a field audit or investigation
is normally initiated where characteristics or indications of noncompliance, such as the following, are present…a business has an
unreasonably low turnover or profit percentage (having regard to
factors such as the nature of the business, its location and type of
customers). 103

Unlike a high total profit, which may be caused by sales volume, cost control, or other non-core business activities, it is
much more difficult to justify a high contribution margin in
other countries where crude oil is an important sales element
on the global market. In some circumstances, the defendant is
expected by the prosecutor to prove his innocence against the
finding of an unreasonably high profit. An example of this tendency is found in the treatment of corruption in the Possession
of Unexplained Property, Prevention of Bribery Ordinance of
Hong Kong. 104
A high contribution margin alone is not sufficient to decide
whether an industry or a single entity is operating as a monopoly. It is even more inappropriate to transfer the burden of
proof onto the defendant because the government suggests, under the Hong Kong Competition Law, that a conviction shall be
classified as a civil matter. 105 Nevertheless, the contribution
margin analysis is still a powerful tool for prosecutors to judge
whether defendants have access to excessive privileges. Thus, if
the court takes contribution margin as a determining factor in
a company’s market status, the next question is how the court
defines the reasonable scope of the margin of the defendant
HONG KONG INLAND REVENUE DEPARTMENT, supra note 90, ¶ 30.
Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, No. 201, (2008) 22 O.H.K., § 10
(H.K.), available at: http://www.legislation.gov.hk/blis_pdf.nsf/6799165D2FEE3FA94825755E0033E532/660A25EA15B8C9D6482575EE004C5BF1/$FI
LE/CAP_201_e_b5.pdf.
105 HONG KONG INLAND REVENUE DEPARTMENT, supra note 90, at 4.
103
104
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against the business market as a whole.
B. Method for Determining Reasonable Profit
Other methods may be used to measure the reasonability of profits, but they are not as preferable as the contribution margin method,
which identifies companies’ earnings through their activities. The
contribution margin method shall exclude income from secondary
items (e.g., income from items other than oil) because they are irrelevant to the main transaction. The contribution margin in US dollar
amounts is not as useful, in terms of comparison to other companies,
when it is affected by sales volume. A low contribution margin from
selling a single unit may result in a high contribution margin when
the sales volume is high. The contribution margin in percentage provides more insight into the profitability of the petroleum industry because it illustrates the margin in the sales unit of oil, regardless of
the sales turnover of the company.

C. Contribution Margin of the Industry vs. Enterprises Listed
in the Stock Market
Analysts may not be able to conclude whether the contribution margin percentage of a petroleum company is high
without comparing it to other sectors. The collected data will
therefore be compared to that of the leading companies of different industries in the same country because the same business environment is necessary for an effective study. The calculation compares the contribution margin of the petroleum
companies in Hong Kong and the United States, as an example
demonstrated below. As the available information on diesel
discount is limited, the study is based on the figures provided
in the Arculli Report’s calculation of the contribution margin
analysis in 2005. 106 The figures of the other listed companies in
Hong Kong are collected from their financial reports for the
year ending on December 31, 2005. 107 The financial results of
106 HONG KONG SAR GOVERNMENT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND
LABOUR BUREAU GOVERNMENT OF THE HKSAR, supra note 8, at 8.
107 The Consumer Council Provides Detailed Oil Price, YAHOO! NEWS, Feb.
24, 2009, http://hk.wrs.yahoo.com/_ylt=A8tU3rno_O1J7C8BIJq4ygt./SIG=12751gh35/EXP=1240419944/*-http%3A//hk.news.yahoo.com/article/090223/3/-
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the listed companies in the same period are not yet available,
except for 2005; thus, this period will be used for the analysis.
As mentioned, it is misleading to calculate a contribution margin using selling prices with taxes and duties because their
amounts are not published separately in the data provided by
the Consumer Council.
The information for the United States is taken from the Oil
and Gas Journal Database, which provides detailed figures on
oil prices. 108 The prices here also include the taxes withheld for
the government. Unfortunately, it is impossible to calculate net
oil prices with public information because of the variability of
taxes and duties. Of the three international oil companies
(Royal Dutch Shell, Exxon Mobil, and Chevron) listed in the
Arculli Report, 109 only Royal Dutch Shell provides sufficient data for a calculation to be performed. 110 Therefore, this analysis
adopts Shell’s industrial contribution margin and uses a similar structure to study the crude oil cost and other variable costs
of the other petroleum companies. To ensure consistent analytical criteria, the study uses the contribution margin figures of
the US market based on the financial reports of the companies
listed in the Dow Jones Index for the year ending on December
31, 2005.
To determine whether the petrol industry in Hong Kong
has benefited from an unusual competitive advantage, the
study adopts a multi-dimensional comparison between the contribution margin of major oil companies in Hong Kong and the
United States to determine whether the former have higher
profits than the latter. The study also provides information on
the competitive environment of the oil companies in different
geographical areas.
au0i.html.
108 OGJ ONLINE RESEARCH CENTER HOME, http://ogjresearch.stores.yahoo.net/price.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2010).
109 HONG KONG SAR GOVERNMENT, STUDY OF THE AUTO-FUEL
RETAIL MARKET, supra note 53.
110 See generally ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC, FORM 20-F ANNUAL
REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31,
2005 (2006).
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D. Assumptions and Limitations
The analysis in this chapter is based on several assumptions, which are subject to the limitations outlined below
1.

“Main Board” Only

It is not easy to define which companies represent the general market environment of a region, but an accepted and
common method relies on the major index of the regional stock
market. 111 This study will adopt the Hang Seng Index and the
Dow Jones Industrial Average to represent the Hong Kong and
United States markets, respectively. The Hang Seng Index has
the largest pool of components valued in the Stock Exchange in
Hong Kong 112 and the thirty components of the Dow Jones Industrial Average represent 27% of the float-adjusted market
capitalization of the Dow Jones United States TSM Index,
which provides near complete coverage of the U.S. stock market. 113 Some private companies may be larger than those listed
on the main board, but this limitation is not taken into account
because their financial reports might not have been published.
Likewise, for the sake of consistency, the same standard (i.e.,
the stock market index) will be used in the analyses for all regions.
2. Core Business Only
The objective of this analysis is to identify the profitability
of the oil companies and, therefore, only the contribution margin of their core business is considered. For example, the study
excludes the income from selling snacks in gas stations because
this revenue is classified as food and beverage sales rather
than petrol sales. The categorizations of core business activities
PUN-LEE LAM & SYLVIA CHAN, COMPETITION IN HONG KONG’S
GAS INDUSTRY (2000).
112 Fact sheet, HANG SENG INDEX, http://www.hsi.com.hk/HSI-Net/static/revamp/contents/en/dl_centre/factsheets/FS_HSIe.pdf (last visit Sept.
20, 2010).
113 Dow Jones Industrial Average: Overview, THE DOW JONES INDEXES,
http://www.djaverages.com/?view=industrial&page=overview (last visit Sept.
20, 2010).
111
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and principal activities are available in the director’s reports of
the respective companies.
3. Geographic Listing Basic for Sampling
A consolidated financial report, listed on the main board, is
adopted because the necessary data from the companies for calculating contribution margin are not provided in the segment
report. This data may not be completely accurate because the
business may earn income from outside the region (e.g., income
from Australia earned by a component of a Hong Kong-based
company), but they are the only data available on this issue.
Despite this limitation, those data are preferable because most
of the components of the “Main Board” for one region encounter
similar situations and crises in business.
4. Weight Average Contribution Margin in Percentage
The total contribution margins of the components of the
Stock Index are calculated by their total variable cost and revenue in weight average.
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VI. APPLICATION OF CONTRIBUTION MARGIN ANALYSIS IN
COMPETITION LAW
A. Comparison of Contribution Margin of Oil Industries in
Hong Kong and the US
There are four figures in the model that are worth highlighting, see Table 6.1:
Table 6.1 - The Three-Dimensional Model for Contribution Margin Analysis, of the Oil Companies and Major
Enterprises in Hong Kong and US
The CM of major Oil
Companies in Hong
Kong – a

The CM of major Oil
Companies in the
US - b

The CM of Major Enterprises in Hong Kong
(Hang Seng Index) - c

The CM of Major
Enterprises in US
(Dow Jones Industrial Average) - d

a - The contribution margin of the oil companies in Hong Kong
– based on the data provided by Arculli & Associates. 114
b - The contribution margin of the oil companies in US – based
on that of the Royal Dutch Shell, for the reason stated. 115
c - The contribution margin of the enterprises in Hong Kong. 116
See infra Part 6.1.1.
See infra Part 6.1.2.
116 See infra Part 6.1.3.
114
115
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d - The contribution margin of the enterprises in US.

117

1. The Contribution Margin of the Oil Companies in Hong
Kong
As indicated in Table 4.2, the contribution margin of regular petrol and ULSD Diesel sold in Hong Kong are 40.83% and
38.76% respectively. As there is no available information on
collective sales volume, the following analysis will apply the
contribution margin to each product separately.
2. The Contribution Margin of the Oil Companies in US
The variable costs and sales revenue of Royal Dutch Shell
in 2005 are USD 48.24 and 67.48 respectively. 118 The contribution margin in percentage is (USD 67.48 – USD 48.24) / USD
67.48 = 28.51%. Unlike in Hong Kong, there is no division between regular petrol and ULSD Diesel in the US.
3. The Contribution Margin of the Enterprises in Hong
Kong
The weight average contribution margin of all components
listed in the Hang Seng Index on December 31, 2005 is
54.05%. 119

See infra Part 6.1.4.
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC, supra note 110, at 48, 54.
119 See infra Table 6.2.
117
118

Table 6.2 - The Contribution Margin of the Listed Companies of Hong Kong Hang Seng Index on 31 Dec
2005, For the Year Ended 2005 120
A

B

Company Name

Cheung Kong
(Holdings) Limited
CLP Group
HK & China Gas
Ltd.
The Wharf
(Holdings) Limited

120

Cod
e

C

Turnover

D

Variable Costs

E

F

Contribution

Mar-

gin

CM

G
as

H

I

Turnover in HKD

CM in HKD

Exchange

Percen-

Rate Fac-

tage

tor

1

HK$14,358,000,000

HK$4,961,000,000

HK$9,397,000,000

65.45%

1.000000

HK$14,358,000,000

HK$9,397,000,000

2

HK$38,584,000,000

HK$21,516,000,000

HK$17,068,000,000

44.24%

1.000000

HK$38,584,000,000

HK$17,068,000,000

3

HK$9,350,900,000

HK$6,036,100,000

HK$3,314,800,000

35.45%

1.000000

HK$9,350,900,000

HK$3,314,800,000

4

HK$12,543,000,000

HK$4,201,000,000

HK$8,342,000,000

66.51%

1.000000

HK$12,543,000,000

HK$8,342,000,000

See Annual Reports for the year ended 2005 of the companies listed in the table.
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HSBC

HK$243,399,378,60

5

US$60,094,000,000

US$28,760,000,000

US$31,334,000,000

52.14%

7.767900

HK$466,804,182,600

6

HK$11,622,000,000

HK$4,038,000,000

HK$7,584,000,000

65.26%

1.000000

HK$11,622,000,000

HK$7,584,000,000

PCCW

8

HK$22,499,000,000

HK$10,467,000,000

HK$12,032,000,000

53.48%

1.000000

HK$22,499,000,000

HK$12,032,000,000

Hang Seng Bank

11

HK$19,029,000,000

HK$7,961,000,000

HK$11,068,000,000

58.16%

1.000000

HK$19,029,000,000

HK$11,068,000,000

12

HK$5,833,300,000

HK$2,933,200,000

HK$2,900,100,000

49.72%

1.000000

HK$5,833,300,000

HK$2,900,100,000

13

HK$182,584,000,00

65.60%

1.000000

HK$182,584,000,000

16

HK$22,945,000,000

HK$13,351,000,000

HK$9,594,000,000

41.81%

1.000000

HK$22,945,000,000

HK$9,594,000,000

17

HK$22,270,800,000

HK$17,229,900,000

HK$5,040,900,000

22.63%

1.000000

HK$22,270,800,000

HK$5,040,900,000

Hongkong Electric
Holdings Limited

Henderson Law Development
Hutchison Whampoa Limited
Sun Hung Kai
Properties Ltd

0

HK$62,804,000,000

HK$119,780,000,00
0

0

HK$119,780,000,00
0

New World Development Company
Limited

32 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION [Vol. 2:9 2011]

Swire Pacific A

19

HK$18,937,000,000

HK$10,755,000,000

HK$8,182,000,000

43.21%

1.000000

HK$18,937,000,000

HK$8,182,000,000

Bank of East Asia

23

HK$7,806,534,000

HK$4,046,276,000

HK$3,760,258,000

48.17%

1.000000

HK$7,806,534,000

HK$3,760,258,000

66

HK$9,153,000,000

HK$4,052,000,000

HK$5,101,000,000

55.73%

1.000000

HK$9,153,000,000

HK$5,101,000,000

83

HK$4,150,741,802

HK$2,078,945,025

HK$2,071,796,777

49.91%

1.000000

HK$4,150,741,802

HK$2,071,796,777

101

HK$6,955,300,000

HK$3,505,500,000

HK$3,449,800,000

49.60%

1.000000

HK$6,955,300,000

HK$3,449,800,000

144

HK$2,972,000,000

HK$2,147,000,000

HK$825,000,000

27.76%

1.000000

HK$2,972,000,000

HK$825,000,000

Johnson Elec H

179

US$1,143,783,000

US$795,625,000

US$348,158,000

30.44%

7.767900

HK$8,884,791,966

HK$2,704,456,528

Denway Motors

203

HK$850,483,000

HK$754,813,000

HK$95,670,000

11.25%

1.000000

HK$850,483,000

HK$95,670,000

CITIC Pacific Ltd

267

HK$26,564,000,000

HK$21,226,000,000

HK$5,338,000,000

20.09%

1.000000

HK$26,564,000,000

HK$5,338,000,000

China Resources

291

HK$53,583,919,000

HK$44,439,151,000

HK$9,144,768,000

17.07%

1.000000

HK$53,583,919,000

HK$9,144,768,000

Mass Transit Railway
Sino Group
Hang Lung Properties
China Merchants
Holdings (International)
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Enterprise
Cathay Pacific

293

HK$50,909,000,000

HK$46,766,000,000

HK$4,143,000,000

8.14%

1.000000

HK$50,909,000,000

HK$4,143,000,000

330

HK$20,631,815,000

HK$9,412,770,000

HK$11,219,045,000

54.38%

1.000000

HK$20,631,815,000

HK$11,219,045,000

494

HK$55,617,374,000

HK$49,956,433,000

HK$5,660,941,000

10.18%

1.000000

HK$55,617,374,000

HK$5,660,941,000

551

US$3,154,835,000.0

US$2,427,728,000.0

0

0

US$727,107,000.00

23.05%

7.767900

HK$24,506,442,797

HK$5,648,094,465

762

￥87,048,831,000.00

￥17,119,687,000

￥69,929,144,000

80.33%

1.053141

HK$82,656,387,891

HK$66,400,552,253

883

￥53,417,669,000

￥5,934,598,000

￥47,483,071,000

88.89%

1.053141

HK$50,722,238,523

HK$45,087,097,549

China Mobile

941

￥181,765,000,000

￥18,533,000,000

￥163,232,000,000

89.80%

1.053141

HK$172,593,223,509

Lenovo Group

992

HK$22,554,678,000

HK$21,381,062,000

HK$1,173,616,000

5.20%

1.000000

HK$22,554,678,000

HK$1,173,616,000

CKI Holdings

1038

HK$2,247,000,000

HK$1,729,000,000

HK$518,000,000

23.05%

1.000000

HK$2,247,000,000

HK$518,000,000

Cosco Pacific

1199

US$295,648,000.00

US$115,551,000.00

US$180,097,000.00

60.92%

7.767900

HK$2,296,564,099

HK$1,398,975,486

Esprit Holdings Limited
Li & Fung Group
Yue Yuen Industrial
(Holding) Ltd
China Unicom
China National Offshore Oil

HK$154,995,389,98
1
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Bank of China (HK)

2388

HK$25,875,000,000

HK$13,001,000,000

HK$12,874,000,000

49.75%

1.000000

HK$25,875,000,000

HK$12,874,000,000

HK$

HK$

1,478,890,676,187

761,627,639,640

(a)

(b)

= (b)/(a)

54.05%

4. The Contribution Margin of the Enterprises in the United States
The weight average contribution margin of all components listed in the Dow Jones Industrial Average on December 31, 2005 is 37.92%. 121
Table 6.3 - The Contribution Margin of the Listed Companies of the US Dow Jones Index on 31 Dec 2005,
121

See infra Table 6.3.
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For the Year Ended 2005 122

122

A

B

C

D

E

Company Name

Code

Turnover

Variable Costs

Contribution Margin

3M

MMM

US$21,167,000,000

US$10,408,000,000

US$10,759,000,000

50.83%

AIG

AIG

US$108,905,000,000

US$93,692,000,000

US$15,213,000,000

13.97%

Alcoa Inc

AA

US$26,159,000,000

US$21,217,000,000

US$4,942,000,000

18.89%

Altria Group

MO

US$97,854,000,000

US$36,764,000,000

US$61,090,000,000

62.43%

American Express

AXP

US$24,267,000,000

US$5,841,000,000

US$18,426,000,000

75.93%

AT&T

T

US$43,862,000,000

US$37,694,000,000

US$6,168,000,000

14.06%

Boeing

BA

US$54,845,000,000

US$45,849,000,000

US$8,996,000,000

16.40%

Caterpillar Inc

CAT

US$34,006,000,000

US$26,558,000,000

US$7,448,000,000

21.90%

Citigroup

C

US$120,318,000,000

US$36,676,000,000

US$83,642,000,000

69.52%

See Annual Reports for the year ended 2005 of the companies listed in the table.

F
CM

as

Percentage
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Coca Cola

KO

US$23,104,000,000

US$8,195,000,000

US$14,909,000,000

64.53%

DuPont

DD

US$26,639,000,000

US$19,701,000,000

US$6,938,000,000

26.04%

Exxon Mobil

XOM

US$358,955,000,000

US$212,038,000,000

US$146,917,000,000

40.93%

General Electric

GE

US$92,589,000,000

US$66,814,000,000

US$25,775,000,000

27.84%

General Motors

GM

US$192,604,000,000

US$171,033,000,000

US$21,571,000,000

11.20%

Hewlett Packard

HPQ

US$86,325,000,000

US$66,224,000,000

US$20,101,000,000

23.29%

Home Depot

HD

US$81,511,000,000

US$54,191,000,000

US$27,320,000,000

33.52%

Honeywell

HON

US$27,653,000,000

US$21,465,000,000

US$6,188,000,000

22.38%

IBM

IBM

US$91,134,000,000

US$54,602,000,000

US$36,532,000,000

40.09%

Intel Corporation

INTC

US$38,826,000,000

US$15,777,000,000

US$23,049,000,000

59.36%

Johnson and Johnson

JNJ

US$50,514,000,000

US$13,954,000,000

US$36,560,000,000

72.38%

JP Morgan Chase

JPM

US$45,200,000,000

US$25,369,000,000

US$19,831,000,000

43.87%

McDonalds

MCD

US$20,460,000,000

US$14,135,000,000

US$6,325,000,000

30.91%

Merck Com

MRK

US$22,011,900,000

US$5,149,600,000

US$16,862,300,000

76.61%

INTERSTATE COMPARISON - USE OF CONTRIBUTION MARGIN IN DETERMINATION OF PRICE
FIXING
37

Microsoft

MSFT

US$39,788,000,000

US$6,200,000,000

US$33,588,000,000

84.42%

Pfizer

PFE

US$51,298,000,000

US$8,525,000,000

US$42,773,000,000

83.38%

Procter Gamble

PG

US$56,741,000,000

US$27,804,000,000

US$28,937,000,000

51.00%

United Tech

UTX

US$42,278,000,000

US$30,935,000,000

US$11,343,000,000

26.83%

Verizon Commun

VZ

US$75,112,000,000

US$25,469,000,000

US$49,643,000,000

66.09%

Wal Mart

WMT

US$285,222,000,000

US$219,793,000,000

US$65,429,000,000

22.94%

Walt Disney

DIS

US$31,944,000,000

US$27,837,000,000

US$4,107,000,000

12.86%

US$

US$

2,271,291,900,000

861,382,300,000

(a)

(b)
= (b)/(a)

37.92%

A.

Analysis
1. The Contribution Margins
The required figures are in Table 6.4 and 6.5:

Table 6.4 - Contribution Margin Analysis when Regular
Petrol is Used 123
a
c
a/c

40.83%
54.05%
75.54%

b
d
b/d

28.51%
37.92%
75.18%

Table 6.5 - Contribution Margin Analysis when ULSD
Diesel is Used124
a
c
a/c

38.76%
54.05%
71.71%

b
d
b/d

28.51%
37.92%
75.18%

Based on Table 6.4 and 6.5, it is clear that the contribution
margins of petroleum companies in Hong Kong - 40.83% (Regular Petrol) and 38.76% (ULSD) - are significantly higher than
the US equivalent, 28.51%.However, a different conclusion may
be reached when the contribution margin of the petrol industry
is compared to that of the general market. The contribution
margins of Regular Petrol and ULSD sold in Hong Kong (as
listed in the Hong Kong stock market) are only 75.54% and
71.71% respectively. The equivalent figure in the US is 75.18%,
which is in the same level.
2. Is Contribution Margin of Hong Kong Oil Companies
123
124

See supra note 114-117 and accompanying text.
Id.
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Too High?
As emphasized above, it is too arbitrary to conclude that
the Hong Kong petroleum companies enjoy monopoly simply
because of their high contribution margin. However, when the
court considers the “totality of the facts”, contribution margin
shall still be one of the most important concerns. Thanks to the
high cost of land in Hong Kong, the petroleum companies could
expect to earn more from the same activity than in another
country. Nevertheless, the Arculli Report still fails to justify
the high contribution margin of the petroleum companies in
Hong Kong over other large enterprises in the same region,
provided that they all operate in the same business environment, the logic which has been rebutted by David Ricardo. 125 It
is also unclear why such a high contribution margin does not
exist in the United States.
For the reasons given above, the court has every right to
ask the petroleum companies to justify their high contribution
margin with reasons other than the factor of land price that is
described in the Arculli Report. This inquiry should determine
whether the companies are violating the future competition
law. Again, the multi-dimensional model here provides a possible answer to the unreasonably high contribution margin of
some Hong Kong companies, an imbalance that could also
prove to be the reason behind high land costs in the city.
3. The Legal Application on the Contribution Margin
Companies may argue that, when it comes to applying anti-trust law, the contribution margin test will increase both
their operational costs and the price of reviewing their statuses
on the monopoly issue. Nevertheless, this test will obviate the
need of corporations to defend themselves against charges of
anti-trust behaviors.
Shenefield John and Stelzer Irwin suggest that companies
DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND
TAXATION, ch. 2 (3d ed. 1821), available at http://www.econlib.org/library/125

Ricardo/ricP.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2010).
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should perform periodic audits specifically aimed at issues of
antitrust behaviors. 126 They also point out that lawyers should
conduct the examination to avoid accusations of “privilege.” 127
As the authors note, antitrust law has become “a fact of life in
American business” and regular reviews are, therefore, necessary. 128 Additionally, accountants should be involved in this
process because accounting principles are generally accepted
not only by accountants, but also by legal experts and the general public.
In fact, the performance of periodic statutory audits under
regulation is not overly costly in the current business environment. In Hong Kong, all limited companies have to be audited
upon submitting their financial statements to the Inland Revenue Department. 129 Furthermore, the data provided by the
companies is accepted by professional accountants as well as
government institutions. Guaranteed by third parties removed
from the legal proceedings, data provides companies with a
means of self-defense and a just method to test whether they
risk violating anti-trust laws
VII. CONCLUSION
A fair and objective test of corporations’ monopolistic power is vital to develop anti-trust legislation that protects the
public without impairing commercial activity. Although the Arculli Report is a viable model with which to test a per se violation of the competition law, in reality, it is very difficult for the
courts to apply this model because it is almost impossible to
prove the existence of price fixing between large corporations.
This article provides an alternative method that uses systematic and reliable accounting knowledge and formulae. If the competition law is enacted in Hong Kong in the near future, it will
be for the courts to determine whether a company or industry
is acting as a monopoly.
126 JOHN H. SHENEFIELD & IRWIN M. STELZER, THE ANTITRUST
LAWS, A PRIMER 143-44 (4th ed. 2001).
127 Id. at 143.
128 Id. at 144.
129 See Profits Tax Return – Corporations (Form BIR51), INLAND REVENUE
DEPT., http://www.ird.gov.hk/eng/pdf/ebir51.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2011).
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As it was emphasized in this article, a high contribution
margin does not perfectly indicate a violation of anti-trust law,
but it is a good starting point for the courts to examine the defendant’s monopolistic power. Judges can use this test to
measure the degree of monopoly objectively. Due to the limited
information available from some industries, the courts can ensure a more accurate test by demanding that the concerned
business parties provide more data and information (e.g., the
contribution margin of all single items). It also ensures that
companies will have a built-in defense against charges of monopoly when they provide data for this test. This requirement
perfects the model and will ultimately establish a solid foundation upon which to enforce anti-trust law.

